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REDESIGNATING TRIBAL TRUST LAND UNDER
SECTION 164(c) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

Ann Juliano*

In 1887, Native American land holdings totaled approximately 135 million
acres.' In the span of less than forty years, these holdings dropped by almost 90
million acres. 2 To stem the loss of lands, in 1934 Congress provided the Department
of the Interior with the authority to accept lands in trust on behalf of tribes.3 Today
many Native American tribes seek to reestablish their tribal land base by acquiring
land in trust.4 Despite the statutory and administrative provisions providing for the
authority to acquire land into trust, less than eight percent of the lands lost have been
returned to tribal ownership.' When land is administratively acquired in trust, the
land is generally not given a proclamation of formal reservation status.6 This tribal
trust land has historically had an uncertain status in the law.7
Jurisdictional boundaries between tribes, states and the federal government are

dependent on whether the Indian land at issue is "Indian country."' Indian country

is a jurisdictional concept and has been statutorily defined as including three distinct
categories of Indian land: reservations, allotments and dependent Indian
*. Assistant Professor, Villanova University School of Law. This essay was originally presented as part of the
Sovereignty Symposium XII, June 1999 in Tulsa, Oklahoma. As an attorney with the Department of Justice, I was one
of the attorneys representing the United States in the Arizona v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
litigation discussed in this essay. The views stated herein are entirely my own and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Department of the Justice or the Environmental Protection Agency. I would like to thank my student research
assistants Lawrence Gingrow and David Seidman.
1. FELX S.COHEN,HANDBOOKOFFEDERALINDIAN LAW 138 (1982). See also Kirke Kickingbird, The Sacred
and theProfane:SecondAnnualAcademic Symposium in the HonoroftheFirstAmericansandIndigenousPeoples
Around the World: A Tour on the Prairiesor Washington Irving and the "HorselessHeadman," 9 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 125, 130 (1996); Elizabeth A.C. Thompson, Babbit v. Youpee: Allotment and the Continuing Loss of Native
American Propertyand Rights to Devise, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 265, 268 n.24 (1997).
2. See COHEN, supranote 1;Kickingbird, supra note 1; Thompson, supra note 1.
3. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1988).
4. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 151 (1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 17,574 (1999) (to be codified at25 C.F.R. pt. 151) (proposing new
trust regulations); See also COHEN, supra note 1 at 45 (two principal sources of tribal trust land are lands purchased
for tribes pursuant to section 465 and individual allotments converted to tribal trust through purchase, gift, etc.).
5. See 64 Fed. Reg. 17,574 at 17,576 (1999) (citing COHEN, supranote 1; BIA ANN. REP. FOR INDIAN LANDS
(1996)).
6. See 25 U.S.C. § 467 (1983); COHEN, supranote 1,at42 ("in 1934 broad statutory authority to proclaim new
reservations or add to existing ones was delegated to the Secretary of the Interior.").
7. COHEN, supranote I, at 45 ("Irihe Indian country status oftrust lands located outside reservation boundaries
is uncertain.").
8. See COHEN, supranote 1, at 27 ("it is frequently important to determine whether a particular event occurred
within [Indian country].").
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communities.9 Within the first category, lands may be tribal trust lands (lands owned
by the United States for the benefit of a tribe), individual trust land, non-Indian fee
land or a combination of all three.1" Because Congress has not specifically provided
for tribal trust land under many statutes, agencies and courts are often required to
determine whether trust land falls within one of the statutorily created categories."
Nowhere is the problem of tribal trust status more apparent than under federal
environmental statutes.' 2 Under statutes such as the Clean Water Act,"3 the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 4 the Superfund law,15 and the Clean Air Act,'6 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must determine the status of tribal trust land in order to
decide if the tribe may exercise authority under those statutes. This Essay focuses on
one such provision - section 164(c) of the Clean Air Act, which explicitly provides
tribal governments with certain authority. 7 Section 164(c) is a provision under the
Clean Air Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program.18 Under this
program, tribes may "redesignate' their lands in order to provide greater air quality
protection. 1' Section 164(c) explicitly provides that lands within the "exterior
boundaries of reservations of federally recognized Indian tribes may only be
redesignated by the Indian governing body."20 Although section 164(c) applies to
"lands within the exterior boundaries of reservation,"2 the Act does not define
reservation." Thus, the applicability of section 164(c) to tribal trust land is
unresolved by the language of the statute.
The EPA implementation regulations define an Indian reservation as "any
federally recognized reservation established by treaty, agreement, executive order, or
Act of Congress."' On its face, this language excludes tribal trust lands not part of
a formally declared reservation.24 Nonetheless, in a redesignation request by the
Yavapai-Apache Tribe of the Camp Verde Reservation, the EPA approved the
request and included tribal trust land within the definition of reservation as

9. 25 U.S.C. § 1151 (1983). Although section 1151 is part of the criminal code, the Supreme Court has stated
that the definition of Indian country in section 1151 applies to questions of civil jurisdiction as well as criminal
jurisdiction. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (citing DeCoteau v. District
County Court for Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425,427 n.2 (1975)).
10. See 25 U.S.C. § 1151 (1983).
11. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 28 ("[m]ost Indian lands are clearly designated either as reservations or as
allotments, explicitly invoking the statutory terms.... A few situations present unresolved questions...").
12. See William H. Gelles, Tribal RegulatoryAuthority Under the CleanAir Act, 3 EtvrL LAW. 363 (1997);
Beverly Conerton, Tribal "Treatment asa State" UnderFederalEnvironmentalLaws,
NAT'LASS'N oFATrY'S GEN.
NAT'L ENWV'TENFORCEMENT J. (Nov. 1997).
13. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 300f (1991).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1996).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1995).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7464(c) (1995).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1995).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(27) (1996).
24. See id.
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contemplated by the Act." On review of the EPA's approval, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the EPA's interpretation.26 Tribal trust lands are therefore, at best, in limbo
for PSD purposes and, at worst, excluded from section 164(c). Because administrative trust acquisition remains the primary method of adding to tribal land, a failure
to include trust land within section 164(c) would seriously impair tribes' ability to
protect their tribal resources.
After setting forth the statutory and regulatory background of the Clean Air Act
and the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program in Part One, I discuss prior
redesignations by tribes in Part Two. In Part Three, I explain the interpretation of
'reservation' under section 164(c) by Congress, the EPA and the Ninth Circuit. I
argue that the EPA's interpretation of 'reservation' is contrary to the scope of its own
regulations and that the Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation. However, in Part
Four, I find that in the absence of the EPA's constricting regulations, tribal trust
lands should be included within the purview of section 164(c). In Part Five, I discuss
two recent developments in Indian law - the Supreme Court's decision in Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government 7 and the promulgation of the final
Tribal Air Rule by the EPA' - and argue that these developments will provide
further obstacles to the redesignation of Indian trust land in the absence of either a
further amendment of the Act or the regulations. In Part Six, I conclude.
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. The Basics of the Clean Air Act
Congress passed the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1963, establishing a comprehensive structure for "protect[ing] and enhancing the quality of the Nation's
resources[.]" 2 9 The CAA directs the EPA to formulate national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS) to protect the public from targeted air pollutants. 30 Based on the
NAAQS, the EPA classifies a particular area as either an "attainment area" or a
"non-attainment area."3 1 An attainment area is a geographic area that has attained

25. 61 Fed. Reg. 56,461 (1996).
26. Arizona v. EPA, 170 F. 3d 870 (9 a Cir. 1999).
27. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
28. 63 Fed. Reg. 7254-01 (1998).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1995).
30. A few common air pollutants are found all over the United States, which the EPA has termed "criteria
pollutants." Basically, criteria air pollutants are a group of very common air pollutants regulated by the EPA on the
basis of scientific criteria (information on health and or environmental effects of pollution). Criteria air pollutants
includeOzone (theprinciple component ofsmog), VOCs (volatile organicsmog-forming compounds), Nitrogen Dioxide
(one of the NOx smog forming chemicals), Carbon Monoxide (CO), Particulate Matter (PM-10: dust, smoke, soot),
Sulfur Dioxide and Lead. The Plain English Guide To the Clean Air Act (last modified Jan. 20, 1999)
<httpJwwvw.epa.gov/oar/oaqpsegcaa/pegcaa0l.hml>.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-9 (1998). See The PlainEnglish Guide To the Clean AirAct, supranote 30.
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specific emission standards for a designated pollutant. 32 A non-attainment area is an
area in which the level of criteria air pollutant is higher than the level allowed by
33
federal standards.
The states are primarily responsible for implementing the provisions of the
34
Act. Under the CAA, each state is responsible for designing State Implementation

Plans (SIP) that provide for the attainment and maintenance35 of NAAQS within that
state.36 Each SIP must meet EPA approval, and ifa state's SIP is not approved,37 the
EPA may intervene by developing and enforcing a plan consistent with the NAAQS
and other CAA provisions.38 Where a state fails to make a required SIP submission,
or the EPA finds that a submission is deficient, the EPA must correct the deficiency
by promulgating a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP), to substitute in whole or in
part for the SIP. 39 The EPA's regulation reflects this statutory scheme by providing
that the "applicable plan" for a state includes an FIP provision promulgated by the
EPA.4" In addition to remedying deficient state plans, the EPA fills gaps arising from

state jurisdictional limitations.41
B. Prevention of Significant DeteriorationProgram

In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to provide for a Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) program in order "to preserve, protect and enhance
air quality in national parks, national wilderness areas, national monuments, national
seashores, and other areas of special national or regional natural recreational, scenic,
or historic value."'42 The PSD program applies to areas which have met the NAAQS

32. 42 U.S.C. §9 7408-9 (1998). Attainment areas are defined using federal pollutant limits set by the EPA. An
area may have an acceptable level of one criteria air pollutant, but may have unacceptable levels for others. Thus, an
area could be both attainment and non-attainment at the same time. The Plain English Guide To the Clean AirAct,
supranote 30.

33. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7408-9 (1998). It has been estimated that 60% of Americans live in non-attainment areas. The

PlainEnglish Guide To the Clean AirAct, supranote 30.

34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-9 (1998).See also The Plain English Guide To the Clean AirAct, supranote 30.The U.S.
Government, through theEPA, assists the states by providing scientific research, expertstudies, engineering designs and
money to support clean air programs. Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1995). See also The Plain English Guide To the CleanAir Act, supra note 30. The EPA,

state agencies and local agencies measure the types and amounts of pollutants in community air.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(1995). The states must involve the public, through hearings and opportunities to comment,
in the development of each SIP.
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-9. See also The PlainEnglish Guide To the Clean AirAct, supranote 30. States are not

allowed to have weaker pollution controls than those set for the whole country.
38. 40 C.F.R. § 52.02(b) (1998).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(c), 7602(y) (1995). For example, several states have failed to submit suitable Prevention
of Significant Deterioration (PSD) programs. In those cases, the EPA has incorporated Federal PSD regulation into
the states applicable plans. See e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 52.2497 (1991).
40. See e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 52.2497 (1991).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(c), 7602(y) (1995).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2) (1995). The EPA adopted aPrevention of Significant Deterioration program in 1974 in
response to alawsuit. See 61 Fed. Reg. 56,461 (1996) (the EPA adopted PSD program in response to Sierra Club v.
Ruckelhaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972)).
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and are thus designated as "clean areas" (i.e. attained areas).4 3
Clean areas are categorized as either "Class I," "Class II," or "Class 11I."44
This classification determines the maximum allowable amount, or "increment," of air
quality deterioration allowed.45 Class I areas have the smallest increments and thus
allows the least deterioration of air quality.46 Class III areas have the largest
allowable increments and permit the greatest deterioration of air quality, allowing
deterioration up to the national ambient air quality standards.47

Under the PSD program, "areas of special national or regional natural,
recreational, scenic, or historic value' are given particular attention.48 Accordingly,

"Class F' status is mandatory for specified federal lands, including national parks
greater than 6,000 acres in size and national wilderness areas greater than 5,000 acres

in size.49 All other clean areas are initially designated as Class

11.50

Section 164

authority to redesignate any lands within their
gives states and tribes the ultimate
5
borders as Class I or Class Ill. '

The 1977 Amendment mandates that a state's SIP must include a PSD program
to ensure that areas within its jurisdiction maintain national ambient air quality

standards."2 Controls under the PSD program apply only to "major stationary
sources"5 3 and such sources must obtain a PSD permit before constructing a new
facility or making major modification to an existing one.5 4 Issuance of the permit is
conditioned, in part, on the assent of a Tribe (or state) occupying an adjoining Class
I area.5 5 The EPA is charged with providing notice of a permit application to the
tribe or state whose Class I area may be affected by emissions from the proposed
facility. 6 The Tribe or state is authorized under the statute to object to the proposed

permit, thereby stalling its issuance by the permit granting authority (typically the
state) in the Class II area.

7

If the Tribe and permit grantor cannot reach a settlement

43. 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (1995). The PSD program also applies to areas which there is insufficient information to
reach a conclusion about their status (unclassifiable areas). Id. See also Craig N. Oren, Preventionof Significant
Deterioration:Control-Compellingversus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1 (Oct. 1998) (discussing PSD program's
goals and flaws).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7472 (1995).
45. 61 Fed. Reg. 56,461 (1996).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2) (1995).
49. 42 U.S.C. §7472(a) (1995).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7472(b) (1995).
51. "[A] State may redesignate such areas as it deems appropriate as [C]lass I areas." 42 U.S.C. § 7474 (1995).
Additionally, the CAA gives "the appropriate Indian governing body" similar authority to redesignate "lands within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation." Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(C), (J) (1995).
53. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b) (1996). Major stationary sources are defined as large industrial sources which emit, or
have the potential to emit over 250 tons per year of a regulated air pollutant (100 tons per year if the source falls in one
of the 28 specified categories).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(3),(4),7479(3) (1995); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(j) (1996). To obtain a PSD permit, a major
stationary source must install the'"bestavailable control technology" (BACT) to control emissions and demonstrate that
the source will not contribute to a violation of the NAAQS or applicable PSD increments.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(b) (1995).
56. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (1995).
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on issuance of the permit, the EPA is charged with resolving the dispute." Thus, the

PSD program provides the state or tribe with a measure of control over sources
59
located outside the state or tribe's jurisdiction.

C. Redesignation Of Tribal Lands Under The Clean Air Act
Since the PSD program's inception, tribes have had the authority to redesignate
the PSD classification of lands within their reservations. 60 To achieve redesignation

under the CAA, the Indian governing body must meet specific procedural require-

ments.6 a Congress gave the EPA the authority to disapprove a redesignation "only
if [the EPA] finds, after notice and opportunity for public hearing," that the
applicable "procedural requirements" of section 164 have not been met.6 z Congress
intended to limit the EPA's rule to ensuring that a state or tribe adheres to the
63
procedural requirements of section 163(b)(2).

58. Id.; See Joshua Epel & Martha Tierey, Tribal Authority over Air Pollution Sources On and Off the
Reservation, 25 ENVT'LL. REP. 10,583 (Nov. 1995) ("because the decision to find a violation and enforce a remedy
ultimately rests with EPA," the tribe is denied the full measure of effectiveness under the PSD program).
59. See Epel & Tierney, supranote 58. ("In theory, redesignation provides tribes with the authority to set stricter
standards for air quality on their reservations and thus indirectly control emissions from nearby sources by exposing
those sources to EPA enforcement actions if they violate the reservation's standards.").
60. Id. See also William H. Rogers, 1 Environmental Law § 3.22 (1986) ("[section 164(c)] is important to the
tribes, acknowledging as it does their power to control many ofthe clean air regions ofthe West where the reservations
are found, and it will inspire the opposition that often attends attempts by the tribes to exercise regulatory authority.");
Epel & Tierney, supra note 58 (prior to the 1990 Amendments, PSD program was the only method by which tribes
could affect air quality on their reservations); Julie M. Reding, ControllingBlue Skies in Indian Country: Who is the
Air Quality Posse - Tribes or States? The Applicability of the Clean Air Act in Indian Country and on Oklahoma
Tribal Lands, 162 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 118, 162 (1993) (noting that the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act
contained the first delegation under the Act to tribes).
61. In order to achieve redesignation, the appropriate Indian governing body must meet the following procedural
requirements:
(1) Announce its intention to the appropriate EPA regional office. (2) Hold at least one public hearing in
accordance with procedures outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 51.102. (3) Notify other States, Indian Governing
Bodies and Federal Land Managers whose lands may be affected by there-designation atleast 30 days prior
to the public hearing. (4) Prepare a report discussing the reasons or the proposed redesignation including
a satisfactory description and analysis of the health, environmental, economic, social, and energy effects of
the proposed redesignation. (5) Make the report available for public inspection at least thirty days prior to
the public hearing, and notify the public of the availability of such report. (6) Give written notice to the
Federal Land Manager where a proposed redesignation would include Federal Lands and afford the Federal
Land Manager an adequate opportunity to submit written comments and recommendations. (7) Consult
with the State or States in which the reservation is located and the Sates, which border the reservation. (8)
Submit the proposal to redesignate to the EPA Administrator through the appropriate regional office
42 U.S.C. § 7474(b) (1995); see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1996).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(b)(2) (1995).
63. As the House Report accompanying the 1977 CAA indicated:
The intended purpose of the [congressional PSD program is] ... to delete the [pre-existing] EPA regulations and
to substitute a system which gives a greater role to the States and local governments and which restrictsthe
FederalGovernment ... by eliminating the authority which the Administratorhas under current EPA
regulation to override a State's classification of any area on the ground that the State improperly weighed
energy, environment, and other factors.
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 7-8 (1977), reprintedin 1977 CAA Legislative history vol. 4, at 2,474-75 (emphasis
added). Although this language refers to states, the CAA and legislative history make clear that the discussion applies
equally to tribal redesignation. See e.g., S. Rep. No. 95-127, at 9 (1977), reprintedin 1977 CAA Legislative history
vol.3, at 1381.
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D. TribalAuthority under the Clean Air Act
Prior to the 1990 amendments, section 164(c) provided the only express
delegation of authority to tribes under the Clean Air Act. The 1990 amendments to
the CAA enlarged tribal authority by authorizing the EPA to promulgate regulations
specifying those CAA provisions for which it is appropriate to treat tribes as states. 64
This express authorization brought the Clean Air Act in line with other statutes
providing for treatment of tribes as states.65 Under the 1990 amendments, tribes that
have satisfied specific requirements for receiving treatment as a state have the
opportunity to assume responsibility for air quality planing and enforcement on
reservations including control over stationary permitting procedures.66 A permitting
program enables a tribe to have considerably more control over stationary sources
and air quality on the reservation.'
6
The final piece of the statutory and regulatory scheme is the Tribal Air Rule.
The 1990 Amendments directed the "Administrator [to] promulgate regulations
within 18 months after November 15, 1990, specifying those provisions of this
chapter for which it is appropriate to treat Indian tribes as States., 69 The EPA,
missing the statutory deadline by over six years,70 issued its proposed tribal authority
rule in 1994.71 In the proposed rule, the EPA issued its interpretation that the Clean
Air Act "grants, to tribes... authority over all air resources within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation." 72 The EPA made clear that this proposal would
encompass non-Indian owned fee lands on a reservation.73 The EPA reiterated its
position that the term "reservation" would be construed to include "trust land that has
been validly set apart for use by a Tribe, even though that land has not been formally
designated as a 'reservation." 74 In addition, the EPA proposed its interpretation that
the statutory phrase "other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction" encompasses areas
outside the exterior boundaries of a reservation (and therefore outside tribal trust land
validly set apart).75 For these areas, a tribe must make a fact-based showing of its
inherent authority over such lands.76

64. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (1995). See 34 NAT. RESoURcEsJ. 231,236-37 (1994) ("the 1990 Amendments left
the legal structure of the PSD [... ] program intact but made minor changes in the programs that effect visibility.").
65. See e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987); 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1991); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1996).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d)(2) (1995). Under the CAA, for a tribe to be eligible for treatment like a state, it must be
federally recognized and meet three additional criteria: (1) it must have an adequate governing body; (2) the governing
body must be capable of implementing the particular requirements of the CAA and applicable regulations for which
the tribe is seeding program approval; and (3) the governing body must be able to implement these requirements within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction.
67. See Epel & Tiemey, supranote 58; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a-f (1995).
68. 63 Fed. Reg. 7254-01 (1998).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (1995).
70. 63 Fed Reg. 7254-01 (1998).
71. 59 Fed Reg. 43,956 (1994).
72. Id. at 43,958.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 43,960.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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After receiving 69 comments, the EPA issued its final rule on February 12,
1998."7 The rule finalized the EPA's proposed interpretations from 1994.78 Under
the Tribal Authority Rule, the EPA interprets the Clean Air Act as a broad delegation

of authority to tribes over lands within a reservation (whether Indian owned or nonIndian owned)79 that also allows for the exercise of tribal jurisdiction outside of
reservation boundaries, provided the tribe demonstrates its inherent authority to
regulate such land.8"
II. PRIOR REDESIGNATIONS

To date, six tribes have requested redesignation under section 164(c). Of the
six redesignation requests by tribes, only one has involved tribal trust land not part
of a formally declared reservation.8"
In 1977, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe submitted the first redesignation
request.8" The Cheyenne sought to redesignate the entirety of its reservation.83

Located in Montana, the Northern Cheyenne reservation was established by treaty in
1868.' Thus, no issue of "reservation" status arose in the Northern Cheyenne's
request.
At the time of the Cheyenne's request, Congress had not yet amended the Clean

77. 63 Fed. Reg. 7254-01 (1998).
78. Id.
79. Tribes have thejurisdiction to regulate their lands by one oftwo methods: inherent sovereignty or Congressional
delegation (or both). See Gelles, supra note 12 at 374. The EPA's interpretation of section 301 of the Clean Air Act
as an express delegation of authority differs from the interpretation of the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water
Act treatment as states provisions. Under the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act, the EPA interpreted the
"tribes as states" provision as authorizing treatment as a state for management ofwater resources only if the tribe could

show ithad "inherent authority" overall water resources in thereservation, including non-Indian-owned resources. See
63 Fed. Reg. 7255 (1998); 56 Fed. Reg. 64,879; Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Chevron Doctrine in FederalIndian
Law and the Agencies' Duty to Interpret Legislation in Favor of Indians: Did the EPA Reconcile the Two in
Interpreting the "Tribes as States" Section ofthe Clean WaterAct?, 11 ST. THoMAs L. REv. 15,16 (1998). See also
Jane Marx et al., Tribal Jurisdiction overReservation WaterQuality and Quantity, 43 S.D.L. REV. 315 (1998); John
S. Harbison, The Downstream People: Treating Indian Tribesas States Underthe Clean WaterAct, 71 N.D. L.REV.
473 (1995); Charlotte Uram &Mary J. Decker, Jurisdiction over Water Quality onNativeAmerican Land, 8 J. NAT.
REsouRcEs &ENvT'LL. 1 (1992/1993); Mark A. BilutAlbuquerquev. Browner,NativeAmerican TribalAuthority
Under the Clean WaterAct: Raging like a River Out of Control, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 887 (1994).
80. "In its... rule, the EPA has interpreted the CAA as an express congressional delegation of authority to Indian
tribes over all lands within the boundaries of an Indian reservation." 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (1998). See Steffani A.
Cochran, Treating Tribes as States Under the Federal Clean AirAct: Congressional Grant ofAuthorty - Federal
Preemption - Inherent TribalAuthority, 26 N.M. L. REv. 323 (1996).
81. See 62 Fed. Reg. 27,158-01 (1997) (noting that although the redesignation program provides tribes and states
withoutauthority toredesignate, "overthepasttwentyyears, onlyfederally-recognizedTribes have soughtredesignaton
under this authority"); Epel & Tierney, supra note 58 ("Few tribes have opted to redesignate although the number is
growing."). See also Joseph Kreye, The Forest County PotawatomiRequestRedesignation Underthe Clean AirAct,
4 Wis. Envtl. LJ. 87 (1997) (discussing the six different tribal redesignation requests).
82. See Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d701 (9d Cir. 1981); 62 Fed. Reg. 27,158 (1997); see also Patrick Smith &Jerry
D. Guenther, Environmental Law: Protecting Clean Air: the Authority of Indian Governments to Regulate
ReservationAirsheds, 9 AM. IND. L. REV. 83, 86 (1983); Kreye, supra note 81 at 90.
83. See Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 ( 9 " Cir. 1981); 62 Fed. Reg. 27,158 (1997); see also Smith & Guenther,
supra note 82 at 86; Kreye, supra note 81 at 90.
84. Treaty between the United States and the Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe Tribes, 15 Stat. 655 (May 10,
1868). See also 25 U.S.C. § 1776 (1998) (settling boundary dispute between Northern Cheyenne and Crow tribes).
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Air Act to provide for explicit redesignation authority to tribes. The EPA approved
the request after determining that the Tribe met the procedural requirements of the
PSD regulations .85 The court upheld the EPA's regulations as valid and determined
that those regulations granted Indian tribes the same autonomy to determine their air
quality as that granted to the states.86
In 1977, subsequent to Northern Cheyenne's redesignation request, Congress
amended the Clean Air Act to provide the current version of section 164(c). 87 Armed
with explicit authority, five tribes have filed redesigation requests since 1977. In
1981, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribal Council requested redesignation
of the Flathead Reservation.88 The Flathead Reservation is a "federally recognized"
reservation established in 1885 by treaty.89 As such, no question of the applicability
of the EPA's definition of reservation arose in this request. The EPA approved the
request and such approval went unchallenged.9"
In 1983, the Fort Peck Tribal Council requested redesignation of its
reservation. 91 The Fort Peck Reservation was created by treaty and thus, an
interpretation of "reservation" did not arise in that request.9' The EPA approved the
request and that approval was not challenged in court.93
Next, the Spokane Tribal Council requested the redesignation of its reservation
in 1988.'4 The Spokane Indian Reservation is a "federally recognized" reservation
established by executive order. 95 Again there was no question of whether the tribal
land sought to be redesignated fell within the purview of section 164(c) and the
EPA's regulations.96 The EPA approved the request in 1991 and such approval was
not challenged.97
In 1995, the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe requested redesiguation of lands
within its reservation.98 The Tribe requested redesignation of 80 acres within its
reservation held in trust for the Tribe.99 The reservation was established by an act of

85. Nance, 645 F.2d at 704. The Tribe prepared a report discussing the economic effects of redesignation,
distributed the report to various interested parties, and held a public hearing. In March 1977, the Tribe submitted a
formal proposal for redesignation, and on August 5, 1977, the EPA Administrator approved the redesignation. Id.
86. Id. at 714. Although recognizing the redesignation's potential extraterritorial effect, the court stated that:
[A]nother element must be considered, namely the effect of the land use outside the reservation on the
reservation itself ....
Just as a tribe has the authority to prevent the entrance of non-members onto the
reservation, a tribe may exercise control, in conjunction with the EPA, over the entrance of pollutants onto
the reservation.
Id.
87. See e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1995); 42 U.S.C. § 7474 (1995).
88. 47 Fed. Reg. 3138 (1982).
89. Treaty of Hellgate, July 16, 1885, 12 Stat. 975.
90. 47 Fed. Reg. 3138 (1982).
91. 48 Fed. Reg. 34,976, 34,977 (1983); see also Kreye, supra note 81; Smith & Guenther, supra note 82.
92. See Smith & Guenther, supranote 82.
93. 49 Fed. Reg. 4734 (1984).
94. 54 Fed. Reg. 1954 (1989).
95. See Exec. Order of Rutherford B. Hayes, Jan. 18, 1881.
96. See id.
97. 56 Fed. Reg. 14,861 (1991).
98. 60 Fed. Reg. 33,779 (1995).
99. Id.; 60 Fed. Reg. 40,139 (1995); 62 Fed. Reg. 37,007 (1997).
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Congress and therefore clearly falls within the EPA's definition of "reservation."'"
In 1993, the Yavapai-Apache Tribe sought to redesignate its reservation,
initially established in 1871 by Executive Order. In 1875, President Grant returned
the lands to the public domain and the Tribe was forced to leave.1"' The tribe
returned to its land in 1909 when the United States purchased 55 acres known as the
Lower Verde parcel. In 1914, Congress appropriated $20,000 for the purchase of
lands to be held in trust for the tribe." This purchase came to be known as the
Middle Verde parcel. Three other parcels were acquired in trust pursuant to section
465 without a formal declaration of reservation status."' 3 The reservation now
consists of five non-contiguous parcels totaling 635 acres." 4 Thus, the YavapaiApache reservation is the first tribal redesignation request to raise the issue of the
status of tribal trust lands not part of a formally declared reservation.
I. THE INTERPRETATION OF RESERVATION UNDER SECTION 164(c)

The EPA's approval of the Yavapai-Apache's request provides the most
extensive interpretation of "reservation" to date in redesignation statutory provisions
or regulations. As noted above, the Clean Air Act states that lands within the exterior
boundaries of reservations of federally recognized Indian tribes may be redesignated
only by the appropriate Indian governing body but provides no definition of
"reservation."10' The EPA's implementing regulations expands upon the language
of theClean Air Act by defining an Indian Reservation as "any federally recognized
reservation established by Treaty, Agreement, Executive Order, or Act of
Congress.""' 6 The first discussion of the status of tribal trust land under section
164(c) came in the EPA's proposed approval of the Yavapai-Apache Tribe's request.
A. The EPA's Interpretationof "Reservation"
In approving the Yavapai-Apache's redesignation request, the EPA first set
forth the regulatory definition of "reservation."10 7 Then, in a two sentence explanation, the EPA concluded:
In addition to lands formally designated as "reservations," the EPA considers trust
land validly set apart for use of a tribe to be an "Indian Reservation." See
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991); United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
parcel,
105.
106.
107.

See 59 Fed. Reg. 43,956 (1994).
Exec. Order No. 04-23-1875 (1875).
See 38 Stat. 588 (1914).
Id.
Id. The five parcels of land are as follows: the Clarkdale parcel, the Middle Verde parcel, the Lower Verde
the Montezuma Interchange parcel, and the Rimrock parcel.
42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1995).
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(27) (1996).
61 Fed. Reg. at56,463 (1996).
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49 (1978); 59 FR 43956,43960 (Aug. 25, 1994); 56 FR 64876, 64881 (Dec. 12,
1991). The EPA has indicated that it will be guided by relevant case law in
interpreting the scope of "reservation" under the Clean Air Act. See 59 FR
43960.'0
In making the decision to include tribal trust land within the definition of
reservation, the EPA relied upon the proposed tribal authority rule under the Clean
Air Act,1" 9 a tribes as states decision under the Clean Water Act and two Supreme
Court cases. The Supreme Court decisions each interpreted the definition of
"reservation" as a category of "Indian country." These case are discussed in detail
below. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) certified in a letter to the EPA dated May
13, 1994, that the five parcels for which the Yavapai-Apache Reservation sought
redesignation are lands held in trust by the U.S. Government for the benefit of the
Tribe. Therefore, the EPA concluded that the five parcels of land were properly
classified as land within the Tribe's reservation." 0
B. The Ninth Circuit'sDecision in Arizona v. EPA
The State of Arizona challenged the EPA's approval on a number of grounds,
one of which involved the inclusion of tribal trust land within the definition of
reservation."' Arizona argued that the EPA's interpretation of reservation was not
supported by the decisions in John and Citizen Band because those cases involved
interpretations of "Indian country" whereas section 164(c) uses thenarrower category
of "reservation." '" 2 Further, Arizona argued that the EPA ignored its own
' 13
regulations defining "Indian reservation." "
At oral argument, Arizona stipulated that one of the five parcels of tribal trust
land (the Middle Verde parcel) is a reservation within the meaning of section
164(c).1 4 Therefore the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA did not abuse its discretion
in approving the redesignation of that parcel." 5 With regard to the remaining four
parcels, the Court held
there is insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that these parcels
have been declared to be reservation by Act of Congress or that these parcels have
been added to the Middle Verde reservation by proclamation of the Secretary of

108. Id.at 56,464.
109. See 63 Fed. Reg. 7254-01 (1998).
110. 61 Fed. Reg. 56,461,56,264 (1996).
111. The Arizona Chamber of Commerce and the Town of Clarkdale also challenged the decision. The Ninth
Circuit found that the Chamber of Commerce lacked standing due to its lack of participation in the EPA redesignation
proceedings or dispute resolution proceedings. Arizona v. EPA, 151 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9' Cir. 1998) opinion
withdra7w on other grounds, 170 F.3d 870 (91h
Cir. 1999).
112. Brief for State of Arizona, Arizona v. EPA.
113. Id.
114. Arizona, 151 F.3d at 1210. TheMiddle Verdeparcelwas purchasedpursuantto a 1914 federal appropriations
act allocating $20,000 for the purchase of lands to be held in trust for the Tribe.
115. Id.
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the Interior pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act." 6
Despite this finding, the court determined that approval of Class I redesignation
for the Middle Verde effectively achieves redesignation for the surrounding four
parcels and that this finding absolved the court of the need to "definitively decide
whether these four parcels are reservation lands for purposes of the Clean Air Act.""17
The concurrence, authored by Judge Ferguson, adopted theEPA's interpretation
of "reservation.""' The concurrence noted that in light of the lack of a definition of
reservation in the statute and the inconsistent interpretations by courts, the term itself
is ambiguous." 9 In light of this ambiguity, Judge Ferguson held that the EPA's
interpretation should be upheld if based upon a permissible construction of the
statute. 2 ' He further noted that in statutes affecting Indian tribes, a canon of
construction requires ambiguities to be resolved in favor of Indians.'
Judge
Ferguson found indicia of federal recognition of reservation status from Department
of the Interior maps labeling the lands as reservation lands and a letter from the
122
Department of the Interior listing the lands under the heading of "reservation.'
Finally, the concurrence stated "[b]oth the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have
noted that trust lands set apart for the use of Indian tribes may be considered to be
part of a reservation."'"
Subsequent to the issuance of this opinion, the Ninth Circuit issued a
clarification to explain that the decision did not effect a redesignation of all the
parcels. The Court finally withdrew that clarification and modified its original
opinion.
We therefore remand to [the] EPA, without prejudice to the parties, to determine
whether the parcels are reservations for purposes of 42 U.S.C. S 7474(c), if [the]
EPA re-promulgates its redesignation ruling in accordance with section V of this
opinion. We note, however, that at least two of the four disputed parcels, Lower
Verde and Montezuma Interchange, are adequately protected by virtue of their
proximity to the Middle Verde parcel. 24

IV. SECTION 164(c) SHOULD INCLUDE TRIBAL TRUST LANDS.

The Ninth Circuit's decision (and subsequent modification) rejects the EPA's
interpretation of "reservation" as including trust land."z Indeed, the court holds the

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1210-1211.
Id. at 1211.
Arizona, 151 F.3d at 1213 (Ferguson J. concurring).
Id. at 1214 (citingTooisgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93 (10, Cir. 1950)).
Id. (citingChevron v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
Id. at 1214 (citingSanta Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1975)).
Arizona, 151 F.3d at 1214 (Ferguson J. concurring).
Id. at 1214 (citingJohn and United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816 (9' Cir. 1985)).
Arizona v. EPA, 170 F.3d 870 (9± Cir. 1999).
See id
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EPA to the language of its regulations (defining reservation as one established by Act
of Congress, treaty, agreement or Executive Order).126 The court's finding of a lack
of evidence specifically tracks the language of the EPA definition: "there is
insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that these parcels have been
declared to be reservation by Act of Congress or that these parcels have been added
to the Middle Verde reservation by proclamation of the Secretary of the Interior
pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act.""1 7 In this manner, the court sought to fit
the acquisition of the Yavapai-Apache parcels into one of the four options for
creation of a reservation.12 1 When the parcels did not fit within the regulatory
definition, the court found that the parcels were not reservations. 129 Had the Ninth
Circuit accepted the EPA's inclusion of trust land, the BIA's certification of trust
status would provide the necessary evidence of "reservation" status. Thus, it was the
EPA's narrow definition of "reservation" in its regulations which led to the court's
rejection of reservation status.
If the regulatory definition is amended, 30 the question remains whether the
statute would support an inclusion of trust land within the term "reservation." In
light of Supreme Court precedent interpreting the term reservation, section 164(c)
supports an inclusion of tribal trust land.
First, the EPA's construction of section 164(c) must be viewed under the wellA court must determine whether Congress has
established Chevron doctrine."
directly spoken to the precise issue and if not, the court must give deference to the
administering agency's permissible interpretation of the statute. 32 The EPA's
interpretation in this case is premised upon Supreme Court precedent.' 33 Further,
courts have found that the EPA is entitled to deference regarding its determinations
13 4
of how environmental programs are best administered in Indian reservations.
The question then rests upon the Supreme Court's consideration of tribal trust
land. In its approval of the Yavapai-Apache's request, the EPA cited two Supreme
Court decisions.'3 5 Both of these decisions included tribal trust land within the

126. See id.
127. Arizona, 151 F.3d at 1210-11. Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(27) (1996).
128. The EPA argued to the Ninth Circuit that the parcels should be considered reservations established by an Act
of Congress in that they were taken into trust pursuant to section 465. See Brief for EPA, Arizona v. EPA, No. 9671083. In that the court did not discuss this part of the definition of reservation, the Ninth Circuit implicitly rejected
the EPA's argument.
129. See Arizona v. EPA, 170 F.3d 870 (9" Cir. 1999).
130. In 1996, as part of an overall review of the PSD regulations, the EPA proposed amending the definition of
Indian reservation to read as follows: "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States government, notwithstanding the issuance ofany patent, and including rights-of-way running through the
reservation." 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250,38,295 (1996). To date, this proposal has not been finalized.
131. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (1984).
132. See id.
133. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Although the court owe no deference to agency interpretations ofjudicial
precedent, if correct, the EPA's reliance on precedent demonstrates that its interpretation of the statute is permissible.)
134. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9' Cir. 1985) (deferring to the EPA's
determination that RCRA does not grant state jurisdiction to regulate the activities if Indians on Indian lands); Nance,
645 F.2d (deferring to the EPA's delegation ofredesignation authority on Indian reservation to tribe under CAA where
statute was silent with respect to tribal authority); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545 (10' Cir. 1986).
135. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band PotawatomiIndian Tribe
of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
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definition of "reservation. 1 36 In UnitedStates v. John, the Court was faced with the
question of whether the state or federal government had criminal jurisdiction over a
crime committed on certain land.137 The determination ofjurisdiction turned upon the
question of whether tribal trust land was included within Indian country. Under the
relevant federal statute, 138 the federal government has criminal jurisdiction over
crimes committed in Indian country. Indian country includes three categories of land:
reservations, dependent Indian communities, 'and Indian allotments. 40 In John, the
Court specifically considered whether tribal trust land fell within the "reservation"
category under section 1151(a).
The Court, relying upon earlier precedent, held that lands "validly set apart for
the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the government" should
be included within the definition of "reservation.' ' 1 The court noted that the lands
at issue in John were held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of the
tribe. 42 The Court explicitly found that these trust lands had the same status as a
reservation. 4 3 "There is no apparent reason why these lands, which had been
purchased in previous years for the aid of those Indians, did not become a 'reservation,' at least for the purpose of federal criminal jurisdiction at that particular
time.""' Further, the court rejected a requirement of formal proclamation of
reservation status: "if there were any doubt about the matter ...the situation was
completely clarified by the proclamation.., of a reservation." 45 It is this language
on which the EPA relies for its treatment of tribal trust land as reservation.
Although the Court in John did treat tribal trust land as a reservation, it did so
specifically within the context of federal criminal jurisdiction and thus, John,standing
alone does not support the EPA's inclusion of tribal trust land. However, the Court
expanded on its decision in John thirteen years later in Citizen Band. 6 There, the
tribe sought an injunction against Oklahoma's assessment of taxes on cigarette sales
occurring on tribal trust land. 47 Oklahoma argued that it had the jurisdiction to tax
cigarette sales because the sales were taking place on tribal trust land, rather than on
a formally declared reservation. 4 8 The Court rejected the state's argument: "[N]o
precedent of this Court has ever drawn the distinction between tribal trust land and

136. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1984).
137. See John, 437 U.S. at 648-49.
138. Major CrimesAct, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994) (federal government hasjurisdiction overcertain crimes committed
in Indian country.)
139. See infra for a discussion of the Supreme Court's most recent holding on dependent Indian communities.
140. 18U.S.C.§ 1151 (1984).
141. John,437U.S. at648-49. Thecourtappliedthetestsetforth inUnited States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442(1914),
wherein the Court held that a reservation was Indian country "simply because it had been validly set apart for the use
of the Indians as such, under the superintendence ofthe government." The court then applied the same test to determine
that certain allotments should also be treated as Indian country. See also United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535
(1938).
142. See John, 437 U.S. 648-49.
143. See id.
144. John,437 U.S. at 649.
145. Id.
146. Citizen Band, 498 U.S. at 505.
147. See id.
148. See id.
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reservations that Oklahoma urges.

14 9

The Court cited John and reiterated that the test to determine whether a state
has jurisdiction over tribal land is "whether the area has been validly set apart for the
use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government."' 50 The
Citizen Band court noted the land of the Citizen Band is held by the Federal
Government in trust for the benefit of the tribe and therefore qualified as a
"reservation for tribal immunity purposes."151
'
Lower courts have reached similar decisions, applying the John test and finding
that tribal trust land should be treated as a reservation.' 52 Even in cases in which a
lower court has differentiated tribal trust land from "reservation," that court also
cited authority for the proposition that tribal trust land could be considered a de facto
reservation."'
Therefore, under John, Citizen Band and lower court applications of those
decisions, section 164(c)'s use of "Indian reservation" may reasonably be construed
as including tribal trust land. A few obstacles remain, however, to the inclusion of
trust land under section 164(c).
V. POTENTIAL OBSTACLES IN INCLUDING TRIBAL TRUST LAND IN SECTION 164(c)

A. The 1990 Amendments
The 1990 Amendments left untouched the explicit delegation in section 164(c).
However, the treatment as a state provisions in the Amendments must be considered
when interpreting the term "reservation" under section 164(c). The 1990 Amendments to the Act provide an argument that Congress intended "reservation" not
include tribal trust land. Congress directed that the regulations were to treat tribes
as states for the "management and protection of air resources within the exterior
' 154
boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction.
Specifically, the Amendments provided for tribal treatment as a state only if "the
functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management and protection
of air resources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within
the tribe's jurisdiction."' 155 The use of the term "reservation" in conjunction with an
acknowledgment of "other areas" within the tribe's jurisdiction could suggest that

149. Id. The court rejected the state's interpretation ofMescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). In
Mescalero,the Court held that tribal activity occurring "off-reservation" could be regulated by the state. The land at
issue in Mescalero was federal land held by the United States Forest Service and leased by the tribe.
150. Citizen Band, 498 U.S. at 511.
151. Id.
152. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816 (9' Cir. 1985) (holding trust lands to be "reservation" lands for purposes of section
1151(a)); see also Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665 (10" Cir. 1980).
153. United States v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565, 1572 n.3 (8' Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336,
338-39 (8"' Cir. 1986)).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B) (1988).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B) (1988).
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Congress intended the term "reservation" to have a narrow definition.' 56
In the Tribal Authority Rule, the EPA interpreted "reservation" within the
meaning of section 7601(d) "in light of Supreme Court case law, including Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, in which the Supreme Court held that a 'reservation,' in addition to the
common understanding of the term, also includes trust lands that have been validly
set apart for the use of a tribe even though the land has not been formally designated
as a reservation.""1 7 The agency noted that two categories of land fall within this
class of non-formally recognized reservations (Pueblos and tribal trust lands) and all
15 8
other lands will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
In response to a suggestion that the EPA amend its regulatory definition of
"reservation," the agency stated:
The Agency does not believe that additional, more specific language should be
added to the regulatory definition of 'reservation,' because the Agency's
interpretation of the term 'reservation' will depend on the particular status of the
59
land in question and on the interpretation of relevant Supreme Court precedent.
Thus, the EPA has consistently interpreted "reservation" as including tribal trust
land.
The EPA interpreted "other lands within a tribe's jurisdiction" as "nonreservation areas" over which a tribe can demonstrate authority. 6 ' In other words,
a tribe may exercise authority under the treatment as states provision for "all nonreservation areas of Indian country."'' The EPA explicitly adopted section 1151 as
the "general parameters" of the areas over which a tribe may have authority. The
EPA recognized the potential for controversy as to whether non-reservation Indian
land fits within the definition of Indian country but determined to resolve such
controversies on a case-by-case basis.' 62
Even if a court were to reject the EPA's interpretation and hold that the
language of 7601(d) requires an exclusion of tribal trust land from "reservation," all
is not lost. As an alternative, the EPA could adopt an interpretation of section 164(c)
not, as states have argued, that Indian governing bodies may redesignate only formal
reservations but rather that formal reservations may be redesignated only by Indian
governing bodies (as opposed to the state). Tribal trust land not part of formal
reservation could then be redesignated pursuant to the provisions of the Tribal

156. See Brief for State of Arizona, supranote 112.
157. 63 Fed. Reg. 7257 (1998).
158. Id.
159. Id. The EPA did provide the following definition of reservation: "for purposes of the Clean Water Act or the
Clean AirAct, all land within the limits ofany Indian reservation under thejurisdiction of the United States government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation." Id. at 7270.
However, there is no indication that the EPA's definition (40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(27)) has been altered.
160. Gelles, supranote 12 at 367.
161. 63 Fed. Reg. 7257 at 7259 (1998).
162. The question remains whether the EPA should get any deference for interpretation ofIndian country as opposed
to interpretation of statute. See Brief of Arizona, supra note 112; Remarks of Professor Royster, Sovereignty
Symposium. See also Skibine, supra note 80 (discussing the role of the liberal Indian canon of construction in the
EPA's interpretation of tribes as states provisions).
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Authority Rule which allow for treatment as a state upon a showing of inherent
authority.'63 Because the John and Citizen Band decisions establish, at the very
least, that tribal trust land is Indian country, a showing of inherent authority will not
be difficult to meet. Thus, tribal trust land may be redesignated under sections 164(c)
and 301(d)(2).
B. The Venetie decision
In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,164 the Court
considered the interpretation of "dependent Indian communities" as used in section
1151 (b).165 The court held that the statutory category of dependent Indian communities refers to lands that have been set aside by the federal government for "use of
Indians as Indian land and ... are under federal superintendence.' ' 166 Although the
decision focuses on section 1151(b), as opposed to section 1151(a)'s use of
reservation, the Venetie decision contains language which suggests that tribal trust
land does not fall within the category of "reservation."' 6 7
First, recall that the John and Potawatomi courts used the "lands validly set
apart" test to determine if trust lands could be considered a reservation. This test
originated in 1914 in the Pelican decision. 6 In Venetie, the Court described its
decision in Pelicanas "[holding] that Indian lands that were not reservation could be
Indian country.' 6 9 Second, the Court summarized its cases decided prior to the
enactment of section 1151 as requiring a federal set aside and federal superintendence
and then stated "[s]ection 1151 does not purport to alter this definition of Indian
lists the three different categories of Indian country mentioned in
country but merely
170
cases."
our prior
This language, it could be argued, demonstrates that the Court intended the
three categories of Indian country to be read narrowly. In other words, land must fit
cleanly into (a), (b) or (c), or it is not Indian country. Second, the Court describes the
test used in John as the relevant test for Indian country generally (or dependent Indian
communities particularly). Thus, one could read Venetie as requiring a rejection of
the EPA's interpretation because the EPA relied on a test intended for the broader
17 1
category of Indian country rather than the narrower category of reservation.
Venetie, I believe, does not compel such a result. First, the Court did not even
discuss the holdings of John and Potawatomi,much less reject them. Further, if the
Court intended the validly set apart test to be the test for "dependent Indian

163. Gelles, supranote 12 at 398 ("some off-reservation lands are... potentially open to tribal regulation under the
CAA, such as lands that Indian nations have purchased and subsequently petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to take
into trust...").
164. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
165. See id.
166. Id. at 522.
167. Id.at 520.
168. United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
169. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527.
170. Id. at 528.
171. See Brief for State of Arizona, supranote 112 (making this argument - the EPA relied on cases discussing
Indian country rather than "reservation").
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communities" only, not only did the Court decline to state such a restriction but it also
failed to provide the appropriate definition of "reservation" under section 1151 (a)."
It is therefore reasonable for the EPA to rely on John and Potawatomi to determine
that tribal trust land should be treated as a "reservation" for the purposes of section
164(c).
VI. CONCLUSION

In order to secure the ability of Indian tribes to redesignate all their lands, the
EPA should amend the regulatory definition of "Indian reservation." Unless and until
this happens, tribes seeking redesignation must consider options to bring their land
within the current definition. For current and future trust acquisitions pursuant to
section 465, tribes should begin to request, as a matter of routine, a section 467
proclamation of reservation status. For land that has already been accepted into trust,
tribe should consider requesting a section 467 proclamation.
If the regulatory definition is amended, the Clean Air Act will support the
inclusion of tribal trust land within section 164(c). The Supreme Court has treated
tribal trust land as a "reservation" under a number of different situations. The Tribal
Authority Rule provides further indication of the EPA's consistent treatment of tribal
trust land as a "reservation." The Venetie decision, although giving one pause, does
not mandate a rejection of the EPA's expansive interpretation of reservation. In the
end, then, tribes should have the authority to redesignate "all of their lands" whether or not those lands are formally declared a reservation.

172. Cf.Malabed v. North Slope Borough, availablein 1999 WL 221563 at *6 (D. Alaska 1999) ("A reservation
is, in effect, simply a more formal or officially recognized variant of dependent Indian community.").
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